Revisiting Design as a Hermeneutic
Practice: An Investigation of
Paul Ricoeur’s Critical Hermeneutics
Marcus Jahnke
1 Nigel Cross, “Forty Years of Design
Introduction
Research,” Design Studies 28 (2007): 1-4.
Despite the plethora of methods, processes, and models that have
2 See, for example, Erik Stolterman,
tried to “explain” design since the Design Methods movement in
“The Nature of Design Practice and
the 1960s,1 we still see a general lack of studies that investigate expe-
Implications for Interaction Design
rienced design practice.2 Although it could be argued that practice
Research,” International Journal
knowledge abounds in the design research discourse, this knowl-
of Design 2 (2008): 55-65, and Lucy
Kimbell, ”Rethinking Design Thinking:
edge is often entangled in other research objectives, is “hidden from
Part 1,” Design and Culture 3, no. 3
view” as predominantly tacit knowledge, or is sometimes devel-
(2011): 285-306.
oped using the terms of epistemologies that do not reflect design
3 See, for example, Klaus Krippendorff,
practice—not least, positivist-inspired ones.3 Even representations
The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation
in the practice-oriented, design-thinking literature are problematic,
for Design (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press,
2006), and Richard Buchanan, “Wicked
in that they typically are dichotomous, establishing design as some-
Problems in Design Thinking,” Design
thing fundamentally “different,”4 —for example, when compar-
Issues 8, no. 6 (1992): 2.
ing designing with engineering, managing, or scientific inquiry.
4 See, for example, Roger L. Martin, The
Although such representations hold relevant insights, the risk is that
Design of Business (Toronto: Rotman
the experience of designing is abstracted away and lost in translation.
School of Management, 2004), and Tim
In addition, as long as these representations lack a solid foundation
Brown, Change by Design: How Design
Thinking Transforms Organizations and
that resonates with practice, they potentially risk supporting meta-
Inspires Innovation (New York: Harper
phors that also do not reflect design practice (e.g., the pervasive
Business, 2009).
metaphor of problem solving), and thus continue to overshadow
5 This article relates to an ongoing experi-
other perspectives and possible metaphors for designing.5
mental project where designers share

Coyne and Snodgrass suggest that the “hermeneutic circle”
their experience of design practice to
“non-designerly” firms, the aim of which
is a better metaphor for designing than the dominant metaphor
is to strengthen innovativeness in these
of problem solving because it doesn’t “…destroy the complexity,
firms. The study is also a contribution
subtlety, and uniqueness of the design situation; or privilege or
to the budding stream of “design-driven
preclude aspects of the process, but rather respects their interde-
innovation.” See, for example, Roberto
pendence and interaction.”6 The hermeneutic circle is also a meta-
Verganti, “Design, Meanings, and Radical
phor that resonates with Donald Schön’s concept of the “reflective
Innovation: A Metamodel and a Research
Agenda,” The Journal of Product
practitioner,” and as Snodgrass and Coyne note: “Even a cursory
Innovation Management 25 (2008):
examination of the protocol studies of Donald Schön indicates that
436-56.
the design process he describes works according to the dynam-
6 Adrian Snodgrass and Richard
ics of the hermeneutic circle, proceeding by way of a dialogic
Coyne, “Models, Metaphors, and the
exchange with the design situation.”7 The concept and metaphor
Hermeneutics of Designing,” Design
Issues 9, no.1 (1992): 72.
of the reflective practitioner indeed goes a long way to describe
7 Adrian Snodgrass and Richard Coyne, “Is
design as contingent, situation oriented, and reflective; that said,
Designing Hermeneutical?” Architectural
Theory Review 2, no.1 (1997): 87.
© 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
30
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“philosophical hermeneutics”8 likely offers an alternative or
complementary understanding that further deepens our under-
standing of Schön’s seminal contribution.

In this article, I build on the work of Coyne and Snodgrass,
who to my knowledge have done the most to advance a hermeneu-
tical understanding of design practice.9 I first revisit Schön’s theory
of reflection-in-action and suggest three areas in need of further
investigation, where philosophical hermeneutics can provide guid-
ance. I then introduce Hans Georg Gadamer’s “historical herme-
neutics”—the foundation for Coyne and Snodgrass’s work—which
at first seems to address these areas. However, after highlighting
two gaps that Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics leaves in relation
to design practice, I direct attention to Ricouer’s “critical herme-
neutics” and “hermeneutic spiral” that seems to provide an even
better metaphor for designing. In the discussion section, I relate
these themes to established design theory to show examples of how
Ricouer’s critical hermeneutics provides a foundation for under-
standing designing that resonates with and enhances established
design theory. Finally, I reflect on and sum up the contribution to
design theory made in the article.
Departing from Schön: An Analysis of the
“Reflective Practitioner”
When Donald Schön introduced the now wel -known concept
of the “reflective practitioner” in 1983, he offered a clear depar-
ture from the dominant problem-solving paradigm in research on
professional knowledge.10 To Schön, “The situations of practice are
not problems to be solved but problematic situations to engage
in, characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and indeterminacy.”11
Schön argued that practitioners deal with such situations through
“reflection-in-action.” In Schön’s well-known illustration of this
process, architect and tutor “Quist” shows first-year architect
student “Petra” how, “by doing,” to fit an elementary school build-
ing to a specific site characterized by a “screwy slope.” In “… a
reflective conversation with the situation,”12 Quist applies possible
8 I use the term ”philosophical herme-
“disciplines” (e.g., a specific geometry) to try to order the ambigu-
neutics” to indicate that I mean more
contemporary hermeneutics developed
ous situation. Throughout the reflective process, Quist listens to
by, for example, Hans Georg Gadamer
how the situation “talks back”—what the possible consequences of
and Paul Ricoeur, rather than the older,
this or that move might be. Thus, he continuously “reframes” the
biblically oriented hermeneutics.
situation in different ways, showing Petra how, by reflecting and
9 See also Terry Winograd and Fernando
sketching in tandem, she could get out of the problematic situation
Flores, Understanding Computers and
she was in. However, as enlightening as the case is, at least three
Cognition: A New Foundation for Design
(Indianapolis: Addison-Wesley, 1987).
areas are in need of further investigation.
10 Donald A. Schön, The Reflective

First, the theory of reflection-in-action still seems for
Practitioner: How Professionals Think
the most part to presuppose a negative something—a problematic
in Action (London: Basic Books Inc,
situation. However, many design situations are more open and
1983), 43.
less negatively connoted than the concept and terminology of
11 Ibid., 15.
12 Ibid., 43.
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“problem” can capture.13 Designers often direct their interest
toward situations and phenomena that may be inspirational and
may spur new understanding without being problematic and
in need of a “solution.” Second, the subject-object duality remains
intact. Reflective practitioners reflect on something by immers-
ing themselves in reflection, but the subject is still positioned in a
traditional distanced role in relation to the object. Neither does
Schön discuss the relationship between the situation and the
“world.” The situation is equally intact and restricted, certainly
complex, but nevertheless “inert.” Third, the notion of reflection
seems to be restricted to a more or less inert self. Schön discusses
how Quist draws on his “repertoire,” but he does not delve into
where this resource comes from or how it is related to practice.
What happens with the self in the act of reflecting on, or preferably
with, something?

These three areas of how to understand the design situation,
subject/object duality, and engagement or transformation of the
self are in one way or the other directly related to meaning. Schön
certainly discusses meaning, but in the protocol studies of this first-
year tutorial case in architecture, more practical and tangible diffi-
culties seem to take precedence, and as Molander notes, “… there is
a lingering trace of objectivism in the sense that he [Schön] speaks
as though there is still a fundamental world of facts.”14
Enter Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Historical
Hermeneutics and Hermeneutic Circle
Hermeneutics can be considered a European cousin to the
American Pragmatist tradition in Philosophy, where Schön had
13 Interestingly, the everyday use of
his roots. Both offer a “relativist” or “constructivist” understanding
the word “problem” began around
of knowledge, culture, practices, social interactions, and so on—a
1920 (Webster’s Ninth New Collegial
Dictionary, 1985), and the metaphor
clear contrast to the dominant “objectivist” tradition in science on
of problem solving has since then
both continents. The linguistic term “hermeneutic” goes back to
become one of the most influential
ancient Greek mythology and to Hermes, the messenger between
metaphors of our time. (George Lakoff
the Gods and the mortal humans who had to be able both to under-
and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live
stand the original message from the Gods and to translate it so that
By (Chicago: The University of Chicago
intended meaning would be understood by humans.15 Hermeneutic
Press, 1980).
14 Bengt Molander, Kunskap i handling
interpretation builds on a long history of Biblical exegesis—the
[Knowledge in action] (Göteborg:
process of extracting meaning from and interpreting Biblical texts,
Daidalos, 1996), 158. The title and quote
which began to develop in ancient times when the Greek and
are my translations.
Hebrew texts were first written.16
15 Bengt Kristensson Uggla, Kommunikation

More contemporary hermeneutics began to develop in
på bristningsgränsen: en studie i Paul
Ricoeurs projekt [Communication at
the eighteenth century by German philosopher and theolo-
Breaking Point: A Study of Paul Ricoeur’s
gian Friedrich Schleiermacher. Inspired by the land winnings in
Project (my translation)] (Stockholm:
positivist science his claim was that objective knowledge about
Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposion,
the meaning of historical texts could be reached through the
1994), 175.
use of method. Gadamer’s “historical hermeneutics” provides a
16 Tzvetan Todorov, Symbolism and
clear departure from such ambitions and in his magnum opus, Truth
Interpretation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1982), 111.
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and Method,17 Gadamer argues that such notions of knowledge
are impossible because both the subject and the object are already
situated in history; alas, there is no objective position. This view was
inspired by German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s ontological
philosophy and the concept of “Dasein”—of being in the world,
and of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit); to be in the world is neces-
sarily to have to interpret and seek to understand (as a verb). Truth
is then found not in any original meaning of a text or work, but in
its application. Here, Gadamer was inspired by Aristotle’s concept
of Phronesis, and a striking similarity emerges to the way truth is
understood also in the American Pragmatist tradition.

To reach such situated truth one has to be immersed in inter-
pretation. Just as leaving the game means to lose touch with the
“play experience,” so the “Ehrfahrung” (experience) that is funda-
mental to understanding is lost if one is distanced from that which
is to be interpreted. For this reason, Gadamer rejected attempts
to build hermeneutics on the strict use of method. To Gadamer,
attempts at distanced objectivity through method mean that
“Zugehörigheit” (belonging) is lost and therefore also any possibil-
ity to reach any relevant understanding.18

Further, to Gadamer the practice of interpretation is truly
dialectical one; it is a process characterized by active question-
ing and answering: the “… art of entering into dialogue with the
text.”19 It is a dialogue that moves in a circular pattern centrifugally
toward understanding. In this “hermeneutic circle,” the movement
starts from our own prejudices (which is part of our own “horizon
of understanding”); in encountering the “other” in the interpretive
process, ideally our own horizon of understanding evolves and
may fuse with the horizon of the other who is to be understood—
Gadamer’s central notion of the “fusing of horizons.”

Gadamer ties these notions of situated truth, mean-
ing, and understanding with the idea that tradition and histori-
cal texts represent the accumulated “being in the world” of
others before us. This fundamental principle Gadamer calls
“Wirkungsgeschichte,” which can be translated “history of effect”
or “effective history.” A consequence of these principles is that we
are always downstream of effective history and thus have access
to the means necessary for true interpretation. In a move that
strengthens his opposition to scientific objectivity, Gadamer thus
considers prejudice, by which he means pre-understanding, as not
only unavoidable but also fundamental to understanding. In other
words, he “gives nuance” to the essential y negative understand-
ing of prejudice in relation to the objectivist tradition.

However, Gadamer’s strong emphasis on reconfigur-
ing interpretation of history and tradition to deemphasize
17 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method
distancing poses a problem when we apply his approach to
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1996).
better understand a more future-oriented design practice that
18 Ibid., 104.
19 Ibid., 368.
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contributes to the on-going creation of new meaning in culture.
When Gadamer emphasizes “situatedness,” he fails to explain how
new meaning might arise. This gap in Gadamer’s historical herme-
neutics in relation to design practice is important to investigate
further. The second gap I investigate is how Gadamer’s focus on
interpretation of existing works fails to give a rich understanding
of how works emerge in the first place. In design, the emerging
work and the design practice behind it are of greater interest.
From Hermeneutic Circle to Hermeneutic Spiral: Paul Ricoeur’s
Critical Hermeneutics
One way out of the deadlock of tradition and authority is to be
found in French philosopher Paul Ricoeurs’ critical hermeneu-
tics. His philosophy builds on Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics,
but it also departs from it in several respects. Most important, it
introduces a critical distancing dimension to interpretation that
Gadamer could not allow in his opposition to the method oriented
approach. It also enhances “poetic redescription” to achieve new
meaning, something on which Gadamer did not elaborate.

To understand how Ricoeur can introduce a “critical instance
at the heart of interpretation,”20 we start by seeing that Ricoeur has
a different relationship to ontology than Heidegger and Gadamer.
While Ricoeur acknowledges interpretation and the notion of
Dasein, he rejects Heidegger’s universalist ambition to let ontology
determine everything. Instead, he follows German Idealist philoso-
pher Karl Jaspers in thinking about merely “ontological indica-
tions”21 —a response to the risk that ambitions toward complete
ontological understanding may shut down further communication.
Typical of Jasper’s and Ricoeur’s philosophies is that they instead
accord primacy to ongoing and open communication. With this
Jaspers-inspired position, Ricoeur re-introduces epistemology into
hermeneutics and establishes a “long detour”22 to understanding
in which that both are involved: an ontologically derived interpre-
tation and an epistemologically derived reflection (which might
even be distanced and critical). These two are intertwined in a
“hermeneutic spiral” that opens up to the “excess of meaning” of
20 Bengt Kristensson Uggla, Slaget om
the world, rather than locking meaning to established history and
verkligheten [The Battle of Reality (my
tradition. This more postmodern understanding of discourse can be
translation)] (Stockholm: Brutus Östlings
seen as a positive, ongoing encounter of diverse interpretations—a
Bokförlag Symposion, 2002), 339.
“loving struggle”23 in which care has to be taken to actually keep
21 Kristensson Uggla, Kommunikation på
tensions and frictions in place because they are fundamental to the
bristningsgränsen, 238.
22 Ibid.
process of understanding.
23 Bengt Kristensson Uggla, Ricoeur,

To achieve this integration of a critical faculty in the dialec-
Hermeneutics and Globalization (New
tic of hermeneutics, Ricoeur found inspiration in critical theorist
York: Continuum, 2010), 28.
and sociologist Jürgen Habermas’s critique of Gadamer’s historical
24 Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action:
hermeneutics.24 Habermas challenged Gadamer’s historical herme-
Essays in Hermeneutics II (Evanston:
neutics to reveal alternative understandings which are obscured
Northwestern University Press,
1991), 270.
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by dominant ideology. To Habermas, oppression occurs in the
“sphere” of communicative action where language is distorted
on the basis of the terms established by the dominant power—
for example, through tradition and history writing. Hermeneutics
cannot detect this distortion if it cannot develop an explanatory
critical perspective, Habermas argued. This understanding
supports Ricoeur’s assertion that critique is fundamental to the
goals of keeping communication open and of enhancing the tension
needed to generate new meaning. Ricoeur thus proposes a fusion
between the critical attitude of Habermas’s focus on explaining and
the interpretative approach of Gadamer’s aim for understanding. To
achieve this move, Ricoeur has to rearrange the understanding of
hermeneutics in four interrelated ways.

First, “distancing” can be seen as a prerequisite for interpre-
tation rather than as it’s opposite. Indeed, the fixation of the text is
a kind of distancing from the “original” meaning already there—
”… the world of the text may explode the world of its author”25
—making an infinite number of readings or interpretations possi-
ble in new socio-cultural contexts. In other words, distancing was
in a sense already there in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Second, to
overcome the devastating dichotomy between explaining and
understanding, hermeneutics has to move its discourse from the
work back to the practice—from the text to the act of writing (or,
for example, from the designed object to designing). Third, when
departing from practice instead of from text or work, it is vital to
emphasize “poetic redescription” within the process of hermeneu-
tics. To illustrate, the use of metaphorical deliberation enhances the
potential to open up the meaning of the text (or artifact) in rela-
tion to what is external to it—to let the text open a “world” (or
many) “in front” of it.26 Fourth, the subject needs to be rearranged.
As Ricoeur articulates it, ”To understand is not to project oneself
into the text but to expose oneself to it; it is to receive a self-
enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds that interpre-
tation unfolds.”27 To receive thus becomes the dialectic counterpart
to distancing; to receive also means to surrender the notion of an
inert self.

Gadamer saw thrownness as an essential to the practice
of interpretation; we might also relate the concept of thrownness
to the result of the practice, as Ricoeur proposes. The design, or
the poem, or the “other” is also something that is “thrown into
the world” as a proposal to be interpreted, and thus it holds the
capacity to open up new worlds. If we then combine the poetic
reference and the ability to rewrite reality with a critical perspec-
tive, we gain a subversive “… mode of the possible, or better, of
the power-to-be …;” “… therein resides the subversive force of
25 Ibid., 298.
the imaginary.”28 This perspective resonates with design practice
26 Ibid., 300.
as understood by, for example, design theorist Håkan Edeholt,
27 Ibid., 301.
28 Ibid., 300.
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who suggests that the innovation potential in design is to propose
how things “might be.”29 For understanding design practice,
Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics and his metaphor of the herme-
neutic spiral thus provides an even richer metaphor and concept
than Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics and circle. Taken together,
the four ways in which Ricoeur rearranged the understanding of
hermeneutics correspond precisely with the two gaps found in
Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics.30 While Gadamer’s circle and
fusion of horizons suggest an inwardly centering and potential y
conserving dialectic also found in the metaphor of reflection,31
Ricoeur’s spiral integrates both a centering movement of reflec-
tion and a decentering movement of communication with others
via manifested and poetically rich interpretations: for example,
designed objects that are open to yet new interpretations in ever
new iterations.
Ricoeur’s Critical Hermeneutics in Relation to Established
Design Theory
Adopting the metaphor of reflection and considering “problem
setting” rather than problem solving, as Schön did, is to take a
giant leap toward explicitly discussing meaning. Here, Coyne and
Snodgrass’s Gadamer-inspired understanding of the “reflective
conversation” further deepens Schön’s contribution. However, as
the previous sections show, Gadamer’s interest was first and fore-
most in how relevant interpretations are made of existing texts—
29 Håkan Edeholt, Design, innovation och
not in the practice of creating new meaning. This mismatch with
andra paradoxer: Om förändring satt i
design practice, which is engaged in active interpretation of situa-
system [Design, innovation and other
tions to manifest new meaning in designed objects (and services),
paradoxes: About systematic change
revealed two missing and intertwined dimensions of design work:
(my translation)] (Göteborg: Chalmers
critique and poetic redescription. Ricoeur explicitly introduces
University of Technology, 2004).
these dimensions to hermeneutics with the notion of the herme-
30 I identified these gaps when I applied
Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics
neutic spiral. If we now take a look at design theory from this new
to three empirical design cases, also
vantage point, what does it say about some common themes?
mentioned in note 46.

First, from a hermeneutic perspective, the notion of the prob-
31 See, for example, Donna Haraway,
lem is fundamentally challenged. As Coyne has argued, a more
Modest-Witness@Second-Millenium
postmodern understanding grants that even the “tame” problem is
(New York: Routledge, 1997).
32 Richard Coyne, “Wicked Problems
wicked.32 In other words, design situations are more or less inher-
Revisited,” Design Studies 26 (2005):
ently “open.” The social dimension of open projects means that the
5-17.
designer has to deal with complex “assemblages” of more or less
33 See, for example, Nigel Cross,
articulated meanings, material artifacts, embodied experiences, and
Designerly Ways of Knowing (London:
more.33 These assemblages could be seen as an expansion of Schön’s
Springer Verlag, 2006), who acknowl-
“design domains,” which “… contain the names of elements,
edges that “… designers are immersed
in material culture,” or Verganti, Design,
features, relations, and actions and of norms used to elevate prob-
Meanings and Radical Innovation, 2008,
lems, consequences, and implications.”34 Further, these collections
who argues that designers as interpret-
are often paradoxical and may have the quality of a dilemma or
ers engage in the “design discourse,”
mystery and be characterized by their “excess of meaning,” to use
which includes socio-cultural perspec-
Ricoeur’s terminology. As a result, even the concept of the “wicked
tives on design.
34 Schön,
The Reflective Practitioner, 96.
36
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problem”35 seems insufficient. It neglects the fact that what is delib-
erated in design is often not so much a problem, but rather is a
typical human situation where inspiration can be found in almost
anything that is intriguing. This understanding also expands
Schön’s discussion of problem setting and problem solving to more
explicitly enhance meaning.

Second, to accept this meaning-oriented understanding
of design situations implies that the interpreter is inevitably situ-
ated in such complex assemblages of meanings.36 To understand
design practice in these situations, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s notion
of “bricolage” might be useful.37 Lévi-Strauss devised the brico-
lage metaphor to describe how myth-making and the generation
of knowledge in pre-scientific cultures seems to be a bricolage
(i.e., collage) of an already existing and more or less coherent or
ruined heritage. In other words, situatedness is in no way an
obstacle to finding new meaning; in fact, quite the opposite—it is
a prerequisite. In addition, as Derrida proposed in a response to
Levi-Strauss’s notion of the Engineer as a symbol of the modern
civilized ideal, even the notion of the Engineer is a myth generated
by the Bricoleur. Or in other words, not even “scientific” cultures
are as rational as they may seem.38 The metaphor of bricolage thus
resonates with Gadamer’s argument that being situated in the
“history of effect” cannot be avoided. It also resonates with his idea
that prejudice and fore-meaning cannot be avoided in interpreta-
tion. Prejudice is tied to and operative in everyone’s own horizon
35 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber,
“Dilemmas in a General Theory of
of understanding, and it has to be constructively engaged in inter-
Planning,” Policy Planning 4 (Amsterdam:
pretation as a willingness to expand our own understanding and to
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company,
be open to the possibility of the “fusing of horizons”—to the under-
1973): 155-69.
standing of something else or of the other. Schön’s Quist and Petra
36 This understanding also corresponds with
case did not really discuss this dynamic and the matter of prejudice,
Krippendorff’s understanding of design
although his notion of “repertoire of domains”39
as “making sense of things” (Klaus
seems to be similar
Krippendorff, “On the Essential Contexts
to pre-understanding (but more objectively oriented). Such aspects
of Artifacts, or on the Proposition that
have also been discussed, for example, by Darke as “primary gener-
‘Design is Making Sense (of Things),’”
ators”40 and by Buchanan as “placements.”41 These scholars frame
Design Issues 5 (1989): 9-39.
primary generators and placements as preference-oriented design
37 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind
tools—approaches made both inevitable and necessary by a herme-
(Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1966). See also Louridas
neutic perspective.
Panagiotis, “Design as Bricolage:

Third, to accept the involvement of the self in interpreta-
Anthropology Meets Design Thinking,”
tion means also to acknowledge that the self evolves in these
Design Studies 20, no. 6 (October 1999):
processes—so that a “richer self may be received,” in Ricoeur’s
517-35.
words. In this perspective, designing is as much a process of learn-
38 Jaques Derrida, Writing and Difference
ing as of generating a design outcome. The designed object can
(Oxon: Routledge, 1978), 360.
39 Schön,
The Reflective Practitioner, 98.
even be seen as a secondary manifestation of this process of learn-
40 Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think: The
ing, if we for a short while bracket our understanding of design as
Design Process Demystified (Oxford, UK:
being about the resulting object (or service, etc.). This perspective
Architectural Press, 2006), 46.
also reflects Gadamer’s thought of Bildung as important—not so
41 Richard Buchanan, Wicked Problems in
much as something that you have to better understand, but rather
Design Thinking,” Design Issues 8, No. 2
(Spring 1992): 5-21.
DesignIssues: Volume 28, Number 2 Spring 2012
37

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as something that that you live: Bildung as a process that makes
understanding possible, as a process of being shaped or of becoming
(as the German word connotes).

Fourth, all interpretation calls for an emphasis on the ques-
tion, according to Gadamer: “A question places what is questioned
in a particular perspective. When a question arises, it breaks open
the being of the object…”42 Questions here are those that emerge
from “wondering”—from an honest wish to understand in a
phenomenological sense.43 When Gadamer discussed questions, he
saw them as parts of a process of intimacy with the work, where
“Zugehörigheit” (belonging) must not be lost. Quist’s sketchings
in teaching Petra may be seen as just such an intimate situation.
However, neither Schön nor Gadamer explicitly discussed the
necessity of also maintaining a critical position through distanc-
ing. Schön did indeed suggest that “reflection-on-action”44 was
important, but more from the point of improving practice than to
understand the engaged situation. He also showed how framing
and reframing is fundamental to the “conversation with the situ-
ation,” but this iterative process in my mind does not capture the
full tension experienced in a critical dialectic and how it can help
42 Gadamer,
Truth and Method, 362.
43 See, for example, Max Van Manen,
provoke and establish new understandings and meanings. In the
“Practicing Phenomenological Writing,”
empirical cases that have inspired my Ricoeur-influenced perspec-
Phenomenology + Pedagogy 2, no. 1
tive,45 it was clear that critical and distanced questioning was essen-
(1984): 36-69.
tial, and as Johansson and Svengren Holm have shown through
44 Schön,
The Reflective Practitioner, 61.
empirical research on the work of industrial designers, a critical
45 For details, see Marcus Jahnke and
Lena Hansson, “Innovation of Meaning
perspective seems fundamental to any design practice that wishes
Through Design – An Analysis of a
to propose solutions “outside the box;”46 and where from a herme-
Gender Bending Design Process,” Design
neutical perspective, “the box” is efficiently shut by a problem-solv-
Research Journal 2, no. 10 (2010): 26-33.
ing perspective that does not acknowledge a meaning perspective.
46 Ulla Johansson and Lisbeth Svengren
In other words, the tension between the phenomenological ques-
Holm, Möten kring design: Om
tion and the critical questioning that resonates with Ricoeur’s notion
relationer mellan design, teknik och
marknadsföring [Meetings of Design: On
of a critical dialectic “at the heart of hermeneutics”47 also seems
relations between design, technology
relevant to design practice.
and marketing (my translation)] (Lund:

Fifth, although many design scholars have noted that meta-
Studentlitteratur, 2008), 41.
phors can help to generate new ideas and to solve problems,48
47 See note 15.
Ricoeur’s notion of metaphor directs its attention to understanding
48 See, for example, Krippendorff, The
Semantic Turn; Lawson, How Designers
rather than to problem solving and idea generation.49 To Ricoeur,
Think; and Tom Kelley, The Art of
metaphors are at the root of how we understand the world, beyond
Innovation (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
“seeing-as,” Lakoff and Johnson hold a similar view of “experi-
49 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor:
ential metaphors” as deeply connected with experienced prac-
The Creation of Meaning in Language
tice and embodied behavior.50 In other words, while metaphors
(London: Routledge, 1977).
can help us see things in a new light and solve problems, as in
50 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We
Live By, 154.
Schön’s notion of the “generative metaphor,”51 they also are active
51 Donald A. Schön, “Generative Metaphor:
in establishing new meaning that may be (partially) solidified
A Perspective on Problem-Setting in
in objects. Metaphorical deliberation might thus be seen as an
Social Policy,” in Metaphor and Thought,
ongoing process of open communication and poetic creation of
ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1993),
137-63.
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new meaning so that some objects—even in design (and often in
art)—may be inherently metaphorical in nature and open up to yet
new interpretations.

Sixth, although I started out by questioning the problem-
solving metaphor for understanding design, the question of
whether a focus on meaning might obscure problem solving in
design bears asking. In the empirical projects that have inspired
my interest in the philosophy of Ricoeur, practical problem solv-
ing has abounded, even though the resulting conceptual artifacts
were oriented more toward asking questions and providing new
and unexpected experiences. The point is that all the problem solv-
ing occurred within a process of seeking an evolving meaning.
Interestingly, this experience corresponds with research in science
and technology studies indicating that science and technology
development is not as rational as it may seem.52 Imagination, meta-
phor, experiences, and other “irrational” thinking are necessary
to coming up with new scientific concepts and innovations. What
emerges is not an eradication of objectivity and problem solving,
but a reversal of the relationship between problem solving and
interpretation, particularly when wicked or il -structured situa-
tions are concerned. Considering the strong position of the rational
problem solving school of thought in industry and society, the risk
that a focus on meaning would replace rational problem solving is
minimal. However, a hermeneutic perspective might help lift the
veil to reveal the fact that even the sudden idea that may solve a
problem comes out of a process of interpretation and deliberation
of meaning.
“The real nature of the sudden idea is perhaps less that a solution occurs
to us like an answer to a riddle than that a question occurs to us that
breaks through into the open and thereby makes an answer possible. Every
sudden idea has the structure of a question.”53
Conclusion
This article contributes to Coyne and Snodgrass’s notion that
design can be understood as a hermeneutical practice and that
the metaphor of the hermeneutic circle reveals things that the
dominant problem-solving metaphor seems to cloud—especially
aspects that correspond to the lived experience of designing. In the
process I have highlighted three areas in Schön’s theory of reflec-
tion-in-action that needed further exploration. Here, Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s historical hermeneutics helps to deepen the under-
52 See, for example, Mary B. Hesse,
Revolutions & Reconstructions in the
standing of the “conversation with the situation.” However, this
Philosophy of Science (Brighton: The
lens falls short of describing both critical distancing and the poetic
Harvester Press, 1980), and Bruno
re-description through metaphorical deliberation that is neces-
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern
sary for the ability to manifest new meaning in design practice.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics and communicative philosophy
Press, 1993).
53 Gadamer,
Truth and Method, 366.
achieve an even better fit by articulating the practice rather than
DesignIssues: Volume 28, Number 2 Spring 2012
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the work, and by using the metaphor of the hermeneutic spiral,
which keeps the tension alive between critique and interpretation,
distance and closeness, epistemology and ontology, so that interpre-
tation opens the work to the world via the notion of poetic practice.

The contributions by Schön, Gadamer, and Ricoeur should
not be seen as conflicting—in fact, quite the opposite. Taken
together, they make a strong case for understanding design as a
practice where new meaning, as well as new ingenious practi-
cal solutions, can emerge through a process of interpretation, and
where more “rational” problem solving is inscribed within rather
than define the process as such.
Acknowledgements
This article is dedicated to the memory of ethnographer Magnus
Mörck.
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