The Epistemology of the Unspoken:
On the Concept of Tacit Knowledge
in Contemporary Design Research
Claudia Mareis
Introduction
The concept of tacit knowledge has advanced to become a prolific
guiding principle in contemporary design research. In their
attempts to describe knowledge within the scope of design, design
researchers frequently draw on this concept and its related
references. They attest that design is influenced by tacit knowledge
in a distinctive way. However, in regard to the corresponding
provisions of this form of knowledge, we must recognize that we
cannot attain an understanding of the complexity of tacit
knowledge using only philosophical categorizations or only the
analysis of individual creative practices. Even more, we must
recognize that tacit knowledge is not merely a “natural”
phenomenon but is created in a social and discursive sense. In this
article, we examine tacit knowledge from a cultural research
perspective and as a sociocultural phenomenon, using the concepts
and lenses of Michael Polanyi and Pierre Bourdieu.
Limits of the Spoken
In The Practices of Everyday Life, French philosopher Michel de
Certeau states that a particular problem arises when theory is no
longer a discussion about other discussions, as is usually the case,
but tends to press forward into an area in which discussion no
longer exists:

There is a sudden unevenness of terrain: the ground on

which verbal language rests begins to fail. The theorizing

operation finds itself at the limits of the terrain where it

normally functions, like an automobile at the edge of a cliff.

Beyond and below lies the ocean.1
Design researchers currently testing the model of practice-based
1 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of
design research have been able to experience something similar.
Everyday Life (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Such research deals with a methodology “in which the profes-
University of California Press, 1984), 61.
sional and/or designerly practices of art, design, or architecture
2 Chris Rust, Judith Mottram, and Jeremy
Till, AHRC Research Review Practice-Led
play an instrumental part in an inquiry.”2 As these researchers
Research in Art, Design and Architecture
(Swindon: Arts & Humanities Research
Council, 2007), 11.
© 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
61
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have experienced, “[t]he ground on which verbal language
rests” apparently also diminishes when design practices and
design objects are regarded as knowledge practices or as “epis-
temic objects.”3

The launch of “practice as research” goes hand in hand with
many controversial questions in design research. In particular, the
inter-subjective and objective communicability of such research
findings, which are created through practical actions, is debated.4
However, verbalization is not the only component that reaches its
limits in the mode of practice-based design research; even the
question about a specific knowledge culture of design—about
specific “designerly ways of knowing”5 —quickly leads to the diag-
nosis of an unspoken knowledge on a theoretic-reflexive level.
Despite its current explosive nature, this diagnosis is not new.
David Pye already stated in the early 1960s that “the essential
nature of the activity seems not to be understood except by design-
ers, and they have not formulated what they know.”6 To date, the
tacit dimension of knowledge still presents a particular chal enge
to design research. On the significance of tacit knowledge, Kristina
Niedderer notes:
3 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a

[...] tacit knowledge plays an important role both in the
History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing

research process and in evaluating and communicating
Proteins in the Test Tube (Stanford,

research outcomes. […] tacit knowledge seems important
CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

for the generation and application as well as the experience
Boris Ewenstein and Jennifer Whyte,

and judgment of research and its results, and for creating
“Knowledge Practices in Design: The
Role of Visual Representations as

new experiences, abilities, and knowledge.7
‘Epistemic Objects,’” Organization
Studies vol. 30, no. 7 (2009): 7–30.
The tacit relativity of knowledge, however, is not to be understood
4 Stephen Scrivener, “The Art Object
one-dimensionally, but must be interpreted in several ways: On the
Does Not Embody a Form of Knowledge,”
one hand, the dif iculty of being able to give suf icient information
Working Papers in Art and Design
about practical activities refers to insights into the sociology of
vol. 2 (2002), http://www.herts.ac.uk/
artdes1/research/papers/wpades/vol2/
knowledge, according to which our knowledge and skills always
scrivener.html (accessed July 20, 2011).
consist of tacit elements that resist verbalization. This paradox of
Michael Biggs, “Editorial: The Role of the
knowledge has been described by, among others, Michael Polanyi
Artefact in Art and Design Research,”
and Donald Schön. On the other hand is the speechlessness to
Working Papers in Art and Design vol. 3
which practitioners have often attested, but which is also linked
(2004), http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdesa_
research/papers/wpades/vol3/mbintro.
with normative language specifications and traditional value
html (accessed July 20, 2011).
discourses, like those described in Bourdieu’s habitus concept. With
5 Nigel Cross, “Designerly Ways of
Bourdieu, the question arises about the extent to which designers
Knowing,” Design Studies vol. 3, no. 4
actually are not able to articulate their practical knowledge verbally,
(1982): 221–27. Idem, “Designerly Ways
or whether in recognizing those limits, an acquired elevation of
of Knowing. Design Discipline Versus
speech is not denoted and pursued because of certain habituation
Design Science,” Design Issues vol. 17,
no. 3 (2001): 49–55.
processes in design education and design practice. The latter might
6 David Pye, The Nature of Design
possibly be asserted all the more the further the discipline evades a
(London: Studio Vista, 1972 [1964]), 7.
spoken discourse.
7 Kristina Niedderer, “Mapping the
Meaning of Knowledge in Design
Research,” Design Research Quarterly
vol. 2, no. 2 (2007): 6.
62
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Tacit Knowledge as a Theme of Design Research
8 Nigel Cross, Designerly Ways of
Tacit knowledge and design are commonly linked to a perspective
Knowing (London: Springer, 2006), 100-1.
either on characteristic design activities, such as sketching or
9 cf. Claudia Mareis, Design als
Wissenskultur. Interferenzen zwischen
modeling, or on more general activities, such as showing, present-
Design- und Wissensdiskursen seit 1960
ing, mimicking, and trying out. What these attributes have in
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 34–54.
common is that they refer to non-verbal activities—meaning
10 Jones wrote: “In the 1970s, I reacted
visual, aesthetic, haptic, performative, or motoric and gestural
against design methods. I dislike the
aspects—in and on which knowledge in design should manifest
machine language, the behaviorism, the
itself in a non-verbal manner. In this regard, Cross’s thesis state-
continual attempt to fix the whole of
life into a logical framework.” Cf. John
ment can be understood so that “design knowledge” is to be
Christopher Jones, “How My Thoughts
located not only on a verbal level, but also in designers, design
About Design Methods Have Changed
processes, and design objects.8
During the Years,” Design Methods and

One reason for the strong present interest in the concept of
Theories vol. 11, no. 1 (1977): 50–62.
tacit knowledge possibly lies in the past—in the history of design
11 e.g., Brian Lawson, How Designers
Think: The Design Process Demystified
methodology. During the 1960s, a promising test to establish a
(Oxford: Architectural Press, 1983). Peter
systematic design methodology took place with the design methods
G. Rowe, Design Thinking (Cambridge,
movement. Primarily favored (although not exclusively) were logi-
MA: MIT Press, 1987).
cal-rational concepts and methods, by means of which the system-
12 e.g., Christopher Frayling, “Research
atics and characteristics of the design should be assessed.9
in Art & Design,” Research Paper
However, because of this orientation, the movement was soon criti-
Royal College of Art London vol. 1,
no. 1 (1993/94). Bruce Archer, “The
cized. The criticism of the design methodology was directed at the
Nature of Research,” Co-Design
absence of practical relevance and at its tendency to overly theoreti-
Journal (January 1995): 6–13. Nigel
cize design. Design methodology had gone from a practically moti-
Cross, “Design Research: A Disciplined
vated matter and mutated into an abstract theoretical venture, as
Conversation,” Design Issues vol.
John Christopher Jones tellingly concluded in 1977.10 Against the
15, no. 2 (1999): 5–10. Alain Findeli,
“Die projektgeleitete Forschung: Eine
background of the criticism on rational design, and ultimately even
Methode der Designforschung,” in
on knowledge concepts, we can observe that design researchers
Erstes Design Forschungssymposium,
increasingly search for practical approaches to the research of
ed. Ralf Michel (Zürich: Swiss Design
design processes. As a result, there is less consideration of the
Network, 2004), 40–51. Wolfgang Jonas,
“rational” aspects of design than of the “creative,” “intuitive,” and
“Design Research and its Meaning to
“tacit” aspects, along with the alleged design-specific manner of
the Methodological Development of
the Discipline,” in Design Research
knowledge production.11 No later than at the start of the 1990s, a
Now. Essays and Selected Projects, ed.
close link between design research and design practice was postu-
Ralf Michel (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2007),
lated—both on an institutional level and under a disciplinary
187–206.
pretense.12 Making this connection in exemplary form, Fatina
13 Fatina Saikaly, “Approaches to design
Saikaly notes that “it could be argued that the main aspects of the
research: towards the designerly way,”
Proceedings of The 6th International
practice-based approach are leading toward the definition of a
Conference of the European Academy of
designerly way of researching […] since it advances knowledge
Design, Design System Evolution (The
partly by means of design practice.”13
University of the Arts Bremen, March

To assess practical, experiential knowledge, the concepts of
29-31, 2005), http://www.verhaag.net/
design research for tacit, non-propositional knowledge conse-
ead06/fullpapers/ead06_id187_2.pdf
quently must be used. Particularly noteworthy here is Michael
(accessed July 20, 2011).
14 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension
Polanyi, who identified practical expertise and skills as a form of
(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1983
knowledge that cannot always be articulated or verbalized.14 On the
[1966]).
basis of this insight, Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus established in the
15 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus,
late 1980s a five-stage model that describes how expertise could be
Mind over Machine. The Power of Human
gained by the internalization of rule sets.15 At about the same time,
Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the
Computer (New York: Free Press, 1986).
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63

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Donald Schön suggested that practical knowledge of designers can
be understood using the concept of the “reflective practitioner” or
with the mode of a “reflection-in-action.”16 He also referred to the
tacit knowledge that professional experts generally have but can
hardly ever articulate. Following Polanyi, he suggests that “the best
professionals know more than they can put in words.”17
The Semantics of Tacit Knowledge
The debates about practice-based design research have been accom-
panied by their own epistemological semantics. Familiar expres-
sions include “design knowledge” and “designerly ways of
knowing,”18 “design thinking,”19 “sensuous knowledge,” and
“experiential knowledge.”20 Further epistemological terms accom-
pany these debates because an intensive debate about experiential
16 Donald Schön, The Reflective
Practitioner. How Professionals
knowledge has been raging in other fields of practice and disci-
Think in Action (New York: Basic
plines since the 1980s. Examples of these terms are “personal
Books, 1983), 68-69.
knowledge,”21 “knowledge of familiarity,”22 “tacit knowledge,”23 or
17 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner
“situated cognition.”24
(1983), book cover.

What these, in principle, inconsistent terms share, is that
18 Nigel Cross, “Designerly Ways of
Knowing,” Design Studies vol. 3, no. 4
they are based on a similar concept of knowledge that is gained and
(1982): 221–27.
applied via practical measures and that is, to a great extent, person-
19 Rowe, Design Thinking (1987).
and situation-oriented (particularly in the areas of work, technol-
20 “Sensuous Knowledge” is the title of an
ogy, and economics). According to the German sociologist Fritz
annually held conference on design
Böhle, the reorientation of experiential knowledge must not result
research at the Bergen National
in an undifferentiated status towards the increasing scientification
Academy of the Arts: www.sensu-
ousknowledge.org. “Experiential
of society, but must focus on its limits and search for ways to
Knowledge” is the theme of a special
consider experiential knowledge in the case of, or despite, scientifi-
interest group of the Design Research
cation.25 In this regard, the terms “expertise,” “connoisseurship,”
Society and the title of a series of result-
and “intuition” play a central role. Strictly speaking, all of the terms
ing conferences: www.experientialknowl-
named are not necessarily to be understood as synonyms for “tacit
edge.org (accessed November 4, 2011).
knowledge.” They originate from knowledge debates in philoso-
21 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
phy, psychology, or education and illustrate correspondingly very
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
different aspects in each. What they do share, though, is that they
1974 [1958]).
address central aspects and attributes that are also significant in
22 Bo Göranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds.),
connection with the analysis of tacit knowledge (e.g., the aspect of
Knowledge, Skill and Artificial
the sensuous and physical experience). At the same time, the
Intelligence (Berlin: Springer, 1988).
23 Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of
wealth of terms also clearly indicates how far the complex dimen-
Practices. Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and
sions of tacit knowledge must be projected and how hazy its
Presuppositions (Cambridge, MA: Polity
borders remain.
Press, 1995).
24 David Kirshner and James A. Whitson,
Polanyi’s Dimension of Tacit Knowledge
Situated Cognition. Social, Semiotic, and
Michael Polanyi is considered to be the most influential, although
Psychological Perspectives (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997).
not the sole, founder of the coherent theory of tacit knowledge. The
25 Fritz Böhle, “Wissenschaft und
foundation for this is already compiled in his major philosophical
Erfahrungswissen,” in Wissenschaft in
work, Personal Knowledge (1958). In 1966, he published the articles of
der Wissensgesellschaft, eds. Stefan
his Terry Lecture (held 1962 at Yale University) in the book The Tacit
Böschen and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer
Dimension. There, the quote frequently linked to tacit knowledge,
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag,
2003), 143–77.
64
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“we can know more, than we can tell,” can be found.26 According to
Polanyi, human knowledge always consists of certain tacit (i.e.,
unspoken or unknown) components. These components enable
human beings to ride a bicycle, play a musical instrument, or recog-
nize individual faces in a crowd, without being able to say precisely
how they do this. Polanyi supports his statements on Gilbert Ryle‘s
dif erentiation between “knowing that” and “knowing how” and
presents human expertise correspondingly as a form of practical
knowledge.27 He thereby develops a knowledge and consciousness
theory concerned not with a static knowledge result (knowledge),
but with the act or the process of recognition and perception (know-
ing); he therefore assigns the human body and its senses a central
position in the production of knowledge.28

Polanyi uses very different examples in The Tacit Dimension
to explain specifically how certain intelligent processes exist or are
applied subconsciously (subliminally or internalized), despite limi-
tations in our capacity to articulate or formalize these processes. For
him, the dimension of tacit knowledge production incorporates the
tacit components of knowledge and expertise, including such
constituents as emotions, physiognomic perception (i.e., individual
elements are completed to make a whole), and rule practicing that
is internalized and perceived as “intuitive” (through the constant
repetition of a practical activity), as well as non-verbalized but
guiding morals and values within the scope of scientific knowledge
production. With “implicit-tacit,” Polanyi does not necessarily
signify the opposite of “explicit-verbal,” but the term can be inter-
preted as the opposite of “focal awareness,” for instance in Gestalt
formation.29 A further interpretation of the phrase, “we can know
more then we can tell,” is that tacit knowledge, although generally
not verbalized, can nevertheless be detected in behavior. According
to this interpretation, “implicit” would be understood as the oppo-
site of “articulable.”30 Thus, experienced craftspeople perhaps are
not able to completely articulate their expertise, but they can often
demonstrate it.

Polanyi, who had initially studied medicine and went on to
26 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (1983), 4
become a distinguished scientist in physical chemistry, draws on an
(italics in the original text).
27 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind
unorthodox reference tool for his epistemological work. He touches
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
upon various discourses and disciplines, although he rarely explic-
2002 [1949]).
itly explains these references. Essential points of contact certainly
28 cf. Georg Hans Neuweg, Könnerschaft
exist to Gestalt psychology,31 as well as to behavioristic experiments
und implizites Wissen. Zur lehr-lerntheo-
in the 1950s on emotional conditioning and subliminal perception.32
retischen Bedeutung der Erkenntnis- und
Wissenstheorie Michael Polanyis
Particularly the ability described in Gestalt psychology to under-
(Münster: Waxmann, 2004 [1999]), 134.
stand fragments as a whole of which they are a part and—depend-
29 Neuweg, Könnerschaft und implizites
ing on the focus—to interpret things in one way or the other
Wissen (2004), 138.
present important intellectual abilities. In regard to this ability,
30 Ibid.
Polanyi therefore spoke about a “from-to structure” of knowledge:
31 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (1983), 6.
“In an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending
32 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (1983), 8-9.
33 Ibid., 10.
to something else.”33
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Polanyi’s statements on tacit knowledge are not in the least
to be understood as timelessly valid, ahistorical theorems. They are
decidedly influenced by concrete historical and political conditions
and by personal cultural and religious beliefs. Thus, he repeatedly
criticized an ideologically based knowledge theory, as it was taught
in the former Soviet Union under Stalin.34 In regard to this theory,
he searched for ways and opportunities to formulate an (at least in
his opinion) ideology-free, holistic knowledge model, yet one still
bound to values and traditions, for “Western” sciences.

In summary, we can say that both theoretical knowledge and
practical knowledge belong to the dimension of tacit knowledge for
Polanyi; but in addition, and perhaps even more-so, he includes
internalized values and worldly wisdom, along with ideological
and religious aspects.35 He thus emphasizes the fact that tacit
knowledge—even knowledge in any sense—is not only influenced
by moral, cultural, and scientific authorities, but also is first real-
ized within the social boundaries generated by them.
Expertise and Connoisseurship
Although great importance is attached to the concept of “tacit
knowledge” in design research,36 rarely discussed is the extent to
which the phenomenon, “we can know more than we can tell,” can
also be understood as an effect of social influence and habit. In this
reading, tacit knowledge is to be understood not only as an indi-
vidual form of practiced, internalized knowledge and expertise, but
also as collectively perpetuated knowledge carried in standards,
values, and traditions. With the aid of the terms “expertise” and
“connoisseurship,” which are frequently linked to the concept of
tacit knowledge and also critically argued, this effect can perhaps
34 Ibid., 3.
be discussed best.37
35 cf. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (1983),

Polanyi already specified a direct relationship between tacit
92. See also on Polanyi’s religious
orientation: Mark T. Mitchell,
knowledge, expertise, and connoisseurship.38 In current texts on
Michael Polanyi. The Art of Knowing
practice-based design research, this relationship is indicated but is
(Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies
only rarely expounded in terms of the social dimension of knowl-
Institute, 2006), 10ff.
edge. Instead, the focus is frequently only on the al eged “profes-
36 e.g., Chris Rust, “Design Enquiry:
sional” aspect of a practiced connoisseurship; as such, it is
Tacit Knowledge and Invention in
Science,” Design Issues vol. 20, no. 4
considered separately, detached from the social parameters in
(2004): 76–85. Niedderer, “Mapping
which connoisseurship is initially learned and communicated. In
the Meaning of Knowledge in Design
turn, Niedderer writes: “Tacit knowledge is an important require-
Research,” (2007), 1–13.
ment for achieving best results in research and practice, which is
37 e.g., Griselda Pollock, Differencing
associated with expertise and connoisseurship.”39 Moreover, she
the Canon. Feminism and the Writing
notes that “connoisseurship […] is referring to an ability for very
of Art’s Histories (London: Routledge,
1999), 13ff, 136.
fine (qualitative) discrimination that is (usually) beyond scientific
38 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1974),
measurement and that is acquired through extensive training.”40
54-55.
Niedderer does not elaborate on the relationship between design
39 Niedderer, “Mapping the Meaning
practice, tacit knowledge, expertise, and connoisseurship in her
of Knowledge in Design Research,”
text, but the impression arises that these phenomena overlap in
(2007), 6.
40 Ibid.
66
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practice-based design research and manifest themselves there
as components of knowledge. Thus, neither “expertise” nor
“connoisseurship” are critically questioned or developed as (histor-
ical) concepts.

To explain the manner in which expertise and connoisseur-
ship are related to the habituation and perpetuation of social
standards, values, and traditions, one can again refer back to
Polanyi. He notes that connoisseurship, like many other practical
competencies, can be communicated only by using example, but
not by using rules.41 Elsewhere, connoisseurship is described as an
“expert’s eye,” which simultaneously pays attention to a variety of
nuanced, in principle indescribable details and quality characteris-
tics; using this impression, the expert is able to refer to previously
experienced, but not consciously present, situations.42 According to
Polanyi, the expert thus sees a rich panorama of characteristic
physiognomies there, where the eye of the amateur sees nothing
of significance.43 As an example, he presents the diagnostic com-
petence of doctors: “The medical diagnostician’s skill is as much
an art of doing as it is an art of knowing.”44 The same expert eye
can also be attributed to art and wine experts, meteorologists,
sailors, or botanists; to a certain extent, Polanyi even attests
that scientists have an anticipatory skill in the search for relevant
scientific issues.45

A fundamental aspect in the analysis of “expertise” and
“connoisseurship” is, as Neuweg states, the fact that the necessary
skills are acquired in a direct encounter with connoisseurs and
expert cultures.46 Such a teaching-learning relationship is particu-
larly pivotal where experience is to be gained by means of imita-
tion, as in design training. To date, this teaching-learning preferably
takes place in a practical, atelier-like training situation and is often
realized according to the model of a master-apprentice relationship.
However, the transfer of expertise and connoisseurship can, accord-
ing to Polanyi, hardly be communicated by means of verbalized
rules; instead, it must be demonstrated on the basis of examples:
“An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted
by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed
41 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1974), 54.
only by example from master to apprentice.”47
42 Neuweg, Könnerschaft und implizites

According to Polanyi, this form of transfer can only be
Wissen (2004), 176-77.
achieved through an initially uncritical imitation of existing (local)
43 Michael Polanyi, “Skills and
traditions and of the authorities of a field. He wrote: “To learn by
Connoisseurship,” in Atti del Congresso
example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because
di Metodologia, ed. F. de Silva (Turin:
you trust [that] manner of doing things, even when you cannot
1952), 393.
44 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1974), 54.
analyse and account in detail for effectiveness.”48 But even while the
45 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (1983),
apprentice surrenders blindly to the authority of the master, the
21–25.
master, in turn, “blindly” follows certain rules that can rarely be
46 Neuweg, Könnerschaft und implizites
designated or articulated as such:
Wissen (2004), 378.
47 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1974), 53.
48 Ibid.
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67

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By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the

presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks

up the rules of the art, including those which are not explic-

itly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be

assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that

extent uncritically to the imitation of another.49
Polanyi concludes that a society that wants to maintain a repertoire
on personal, tacit knowledge must be committed to tradition. In his
work, he strove in an almost paradoxical manner to uphold tradi-
tions and value systems, while also exposing how implicit limits of
knowledge manifest as traditional values during the acquisition
and transfer of knowledge and how they are perpetuated through
authoritative relationships.
Social Habituation Based on Bourdieu
Polanyi’s insights on the social constructs that limit individual
behavior raise the question of what is required to generate a stable,
collective anchoring of values, traditions, and standards that influ-
ence individual human thought and behavior. This question has
been particularly handled by the French sociologist, Pierre
Bourdieu. His theories regarding this question can be productive
for the critical designation of a tacit dimension of knowledge in
design. Bourdieu’s habitus concept exhibits numerous points of
contact to Polanyi’s statements on tacit knowledge, although
Bourdieu ultimately showed less interest in the continuation of
traditions and value systems than in individual freedom of decision
and choice.50

Similar to Polanyi, who establishes the dimension of tacit
knowledge in different, intertwined levels of thought and action,
Bourdieu assumes that an analytical difference between perception,
thought, and action is not sustainable. According to Bourdieu,
habituated perception, thought, and action schemes intertwine
themselves in individual practices and consistently act together as
implicit structures, or as “social sense:”
49 Ibid.

The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of
50 cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory
of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge

regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend
University Press, 2010 [1977]), 78–95.

to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective
51 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice

conditions of the production of their generative principle,
(2010), 78.

while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective
52 Marcel Mauss, “Les Techniques du

potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive
corps,”Journal de Psychologie 32 (1934):

and motivating structures making up the habitus.51
3–4. Reprinted in Marcel Mauss,
Sociologie et anthropologie (Paris:
PUF, 1936).
Bourdieu developed the habitus concept subsequent to Marcel
53 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process –
Mauss’s terms of “body techniques” (techniques du corps) and
The History of Manners (vol. I) and The
“hexis”52 and Norbert Elias’s writings on the genesis of civiliza-
Civilizing Process – State Formation and
tion.53 The habitus as conceptualized by Bourdieu comprises the all
Civilization (vol. II) (Oxford: Blackwell,
1969 and 1982).
68
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habits, customs, physical abilities, aesthetic and cultural prefer-
ences, and additional non-discursive aspects of knowledge that are
considered self-evident to a specific social group.54 For him, the
deciding factor is the assumption that habitus is not inherent, but
instead is based on learned individual and col ective experiences,
which deposit themselves in an individual as determining percep-
tion, thought, and action schemes. From early childhood on, the
limits of our individual behavior, perception, and thought are
therefore determined by predetermined material and cultural exis-
tential conditions, by social class, and by gender.

Nevertheless, the genesis (or “becoming,” from the Greek) of
the habitus of the players is usually “unconscious” because it
becomes, as a matter of course, something that is experienced as
“natural.” According to Bourdieu, “[t]he ‘unconscious’ is never
anything other than the forgetting of history which history
produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in
the second natures of habitus.”55 This early and, above all, implicit
influence leads even to having the prevailing social order registered
in the body by means of habituated schemes. In this regard,
Bourdieu also speaks about an “implicit pedagogy” or a “somatiza-
tion” of knowledge with far-reaching consequences.56 Prevailing
social power and dominance relationships are internalized through
habituation and accepted as “natural” (naturalized) and thereby
forgotten. He even sees the implicit dimension of knowledge of
practitioners as being a result of this mechanism:

It is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what

they are doing that what they do has more meaning than

they know. The habitus is the universalizing mediation,

which causes an individual agent’s practices, without

either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the

less “sensible” and “reasonable.” That part of practices,

which remains obscure in the eyes of their own producers,

is the aspect by which they are objectively adjusted to other
54 cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A

practices and to the structures of which the principle of
Social Critique of the Judgment of

their production is itself the product.57
Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1984).
55 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice
For Bourdieu, the term habitus is indivisibly coupled with that of
(2010), 78.
the social field. In collective interaction, they both outline the
56 Ibid., 94.
dimension of practice. The dialectic of habitus and social field is
57 Ibid., 79.
based on the assumption that behavior is always performed
58 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice
within a specific context and from a certain position.58 Foremost,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1990).
behavior has significance when interpretation of it includes the
59 cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus
position of the actor in a socially well-differentiated field. This
(London: Polity Press, 1990). Idem, Rules
perspective on behavior is valid for science, as well as for politics,
of Art: Genesis and Structure of the
religion, and art.59 Individuals are socialized into distinct fields
Literary Field (Stanford: Stanford
and learn to behave appropriately according to the rules that apply
University Press, 1996).
there and the prevailing “symbolic capital.”60 Although social
60 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (1990),
112–21.
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fields provide actors with individual options for action, these
actions are limited and apply to certain (often non-verbalized)
constraints at the same time.

This observation can also be applied to the acquisition and
transfer of connoisseurship and expertise in design. Design educa-
tion, practice, and research are structured by means of certain
implicit, practical, and social rules and self-conceptions and are
transferred to a certain extent via tradition and authority. This
complexity in the transfer process is even the case when the trans-
fer does not take place perpetually but contingently, and it is
renewed and changes with every generation. Often, precisely those
components of the discourse of values that are bound to social
tradition and authority remain implicit in design. For instance, the
measuring of quality criteria in design or the gender-specific inclu-
sion and exclusion processes in design education and practice
reflect this implicitness. In this sense, Richard Sennett states in his
book on craftsmanship that a large portion of authority possessed
by master craftspeople stems from their knowing things that others
don’t and that this authority is presented non-verbally.61
Speaking Bans, Taboos, and Naturalizations
In regard to the spoken, the fact that “we can know more than we
can tell” can be understood in such a way that tacit knowledge,
rather than just presenting a “natural” circumstance, also includes
the effects of social habituation, which always are manifested in it.
Tacit knowledge can thus first be understood as a complex of
certain incorporated cultural capital. It comprises practical and
semantic knowledge, schemes, rules, and scripts, as well as values
and standards, abilities, competencies, and skills.62 If we transfer
this interpretation of tacit knowledge to the field of design, we can
assume that social and cultural determinants not only enable the
explicit designation and provision of detailed information on a
particular circumstance, activity, or knowledge, but also can
impede or even prevent it. We do not mean to suggest that, theo-
retically, all knowledge and expertise can be verbalized, quantified,
and formulated; rather, we do not see that a supposed “natural”
epistemic structure of tacit knowledge in design is the only expla-
nation why the knowledge of design practitioners remains “mute.”

This interpretation indicates that the limits of what can be
said by individuals is difficult to identify as such for two reasons:
61 Richard Sennett, Handwerk (Berlin:
First, certain social orders are “incorporated” through habituation,
Berlin Verlag, 2008), 109. English edition:
and second, the regulation mechanisms of a discourse are usually
The Craftsman (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008).
unspoken and, as such, are performed and perpetuated without
62 Michael Meier, “Bourdieus Theorie der
being detected. Michel Foucault, in repeatedly pointing out this
Praxis. Eine ‘Theorie sozialer Praktiken’?,”
mechanism, asserted that discourses are always cultivated by
in Doing Culture. Neue Positionen zum
certain taboos and speaking bans. Such sanctions can be recognized
Verhältnis von Kultur und sozialer Praxis,
by the fact that one does not have the right to say everything; that
eds. Karl H. Hörning and Julia Reuter
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2004), 66.
one can’t speak about everything at every opportunity; and that, in
70
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the end, not just anybody can speak about anything.63 This assess-
ment can also be transferred to design for the purpose of critically
questioning its intrinsic speaking bans and taboos.

In conclusion, a sensibility to the social dimension of knowl-
edge seems essential for design researchers if we seek to avoid a
positivistic reduction or a “romantic idealization” of tacit knowl-
edge.64 In regard to the implicit habituation and somatization of
knowledge, it is appropriate to critically question the “often-
declared as natural” apriorism of design. Design definitions based
on such apriorisms, suggest, for example, that design is a “natural
human ability” or an “essentially innate human capacity.”65 Such
definitions marginalize the varied historical influences that deci-
sively shape different design practices, and they conceal the
cultural context and the social conventions that enable the acquisi-
tion of these practices in the first place. According to Roland
Barthes, the myth about the “conditio humana” is based on an age-
old mystification that has always involved counting on the funda-
mentals of the history of nature.66 “Naturalization” consequently
signifies that social, man-made meanings and orders are under-
stood as originating from “nature,” and such natural findings–as
myths–shape history. Similarly, the habitus, Bourdieu writes, is
“history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such.”67

The currently targeted nexus of design practice and design
research seems to indicate a vulnerability that would allow
conveyed historical and social y standardized (self-)conceptions to
flow into design research as “naturalized“ findings and to be
perpetuated there without being questioned. The debates on “tacit
knowledge,” in particular, are vulnerable to such naturalizations
because the human body is addressed therein as an allegedly
“natural” medium of knowledge. The danger is that knowledge
63 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology
will be understood unilaterally as biological phenomenon and that
of Knowledge and the Discourse on
its significant socio-cultural dimension will be ignored. An insis-
Language (New York: Pantheon, 1972),
tence that we declare designerly practices in the context of research
215ff.
as “tacit,” might then work against a transparently conducted
64 Neuweg, Könnerschaft und implizites
Wissen (2004), 401.
knowledge discourse that avoids or rejects the critical analysis of
65 cf. Filippo A. Salustri and Nathan L. Eng,
natural and mythological figures in design discourses.
“Design as…: Thinking of what Design

Concepts and models of a tacit knowledge are not free from
might be,” Journal of Design Principles
“blind spots” themselves. They have been influenced by specific
and Practices vol. 1, no. 1 (2007): 24-25.
historical knowledge debates and social and economic contexts.
66 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1972).
Design researchers must consider such historical influences in the
67 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice
analysis of tacit knowledge and make the influences compatible
(2010), 78.
with current knowledge debates.
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